We evaluate the folk wisdom that algorithms trained on data produced by biased human decision-makers necessarily reflect this bias. We consider a setting where training labels are only generated if a biased decision-maker takes a particular action, and so bias arises due to selection into the training data. In our baseline model, the more biased the decision-maker is toward a group, the more the algorithm favors that group. We refer to this phenomenon as algorithmic affirmative action. We then clarify the conditions that give rise to algorithmic affirmative action. Whether a prediction algorithm reverses or inherits bias depends critically on how the decision-maker affects the training data as well as the label used in training. We illustrate our main theoretical results in a simulation study applied to the New York City Stop, Question and Frisk dataset. * We are grateful to
Introduction
Algorithms have the promise to improve upon human decision-making in a variety of settings, but concerns abound that algorithms may produce decision rules that are biased against particular groups. A particular fear is that if the training data is generated by a process that is biased against a group, then the algorithm will reflect this bias. This concern is captured by the common refrain "bias in, bias out" (Barocas and Selbst, 2016; Mayson, 2018) .
In this paper, we evaluate the folk wisdom that algorithms trained on data produced by biased human decision-makers will necessarily inherit bias. Through the lens of a classic model of discrimination in economics, we illustrate that algorithms trained over biased data do not necessarily inherit bias. In fact, for a common class of prediction exercises, we show that the opposite is true:
The more biased the decision-maker is toward a group in the training data, the more favorable the algorithm is toward that group. We refer to this phenomenon as algorithmic affirmative action. We clarify the conditions that give rise to algorithmic affirmative action and discuss how alternative biases in the training data affect resulting algorithms.
We consider a baseline model with three elements that together produce algorithmic affirmative action. First, we consider a setting in which labels in the training data are created only if a decision-maker chooses to take a particular action. This is commonly known as the selective labels problem (Lakkaraju et al., 2017; . For instance, we may only obtain data on whether a pedestrian is carrying contraband if a police officer chooses to search the pedestrian. 1 Second, we follow a classic literature in the economics of discrimination and assume that the decision-maker is a taste-based discriminator against the disadvantaged group (Becker, 1957; Altonji and Blank, 1999; Knowles et al., 2001; Anwar and Fang, 2006; Arnold et al., 2018) . This means that the decision-maker acts as if they receive a different payoff (or face a different cost) for taking the action of interest against a particular group. This may arise due to preferences, costs, or misperceptions. As a result, bias in our model manifests itself through selection into the training data. Finally, we assume that the decision-maker has access to unobservables, which are features that are informative about the label of interest but are unavailable in the observed training data.
Each of these three elements -selective labels, taste-based discrimination and unobservables -are critical to algorithmic affirmative action.
In this baseline model, we then show that the more biased the decision-maker is toward the disadvantaged group, the more favorable the resulting algorithm is toward the disadvantaged group.
To illustrate the intuition for this result, consider the example of police searches from earlier. Sup- pose that police assess the probability that an individual is carrying contraband, and search people with high assessed probabilities. Police base their search decision on a number of factors that are recorded in the data (the time of stop, location, demographics of the individual), as well as subjective information that is not recorded in the data (their evaluation of the individual's behavior). Because police choose to search individuals with risky behavior that is unobservable to the data scientist, an algorithm trained to predict whether contraband was found using a sample of conducted searches will tend to make predictions that are too high for the general population.
However, this selection issue will be mitigated for African Americans if police officers are racially biased. Indeed, in the extreme case where police officers are so biased that they search all African Americans, regardless of underlying risk, then there will be no selection on unobservable behavior for African Americans in the training data. Thus, the more biased are police officers, the more favorable is the training data for African Americans, and hence the more the algorithm learns to favor African Americans.
Our results do not imply that biased data can never produce biased algorithms -rather, whether an algorithm does or does not inherit bias depends crucially on the form of the bias and the training of the algorithm. To illustrate this, we consider modifications to our baseline model that can produce effects in line with the usual "bias in, bias out" intuition. First, algorithmic affirmative action crucially depends on the fact that the algorithm is trained to predict the outcome of interest (carrying contraband in the policing example) in the sample where the outcome is available. The typical "bias in, bias out" result can be obtained if either i) the algorithm is instead trained to predict the human decision, or ii) the outcome of interest is assumed to be zero for those not selected by the human decision-maker. Second, while we assume that selection into the training data is determined by a biased decision-making process, we assume that the label of interest is measured without bias. This rules out "label bias," an additional source of bias in training data that is often mentioned in the literature on algorithmic fairness -see Corbett-Davies and Goel (2018) for a discussion.
This paper relates to several recent works that study fairness and discrimination in a variety of fields across computer science and the social sciences. First, several papers consider properties of algorithms that are trained on selectively-labelled data. and Lakkaraju et al. (2017) define the selective labels problem and discuss its implications for evaluating the predictive performance of algorithms. Kallus and Zhou (2018) studies how the selective labels problem impacts fairness-adjusted predictors. De-Arteaga et al. (2018) illustrates that the selective labels problem cannot be addressed via standard sample selection procedures and propose a new techniques to deal with it. Cowgill (2019) shows that even if there are selective labels, an algorithm trained on selectively-labelled data will not be biased provided that the human decisions are sufficiently noisy. Madras et al. (2019) proposes a causal modeling approach to estimating fair prediction functions in the presence of unobserved features. Finally, Kannan et al. (2018) studies the related problem of how a fairness-minded decision-maker (e.g. college admissions officer) should select a screening rule if the selected data from that screening decision are used downstream by a Bayesian decision-maker (e.g. employer).
Our work is also related to a series of legal papers that have argued that automating decisions will magnify discrimination due to historical biases in existing training data -see Selbst (2016), Chander (2017) , Mayson (2018) . Our empirical application applies our result to police searches to New York Stop, Question and Frisk. A large literature raises concerns about biased training data in the context of the broader criminal justice system -see Lum and Isaac (2016) and Selbst (2017) among many others. In contrast, our results suggest that for certain prediction exercises, historical biases in training data can produce an automated decision rule that reverses discrimination. Conversely, our results also imply that if an algorithm is trained on data that is produced by a decision-maker that exhibits explicit affirmative action towards a group, the algorithm could, in fact, inherit bias.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our baseline model. Section 3 states and proves the main results. Section 4 illustrates our results in simulations based on New York Stop, Question and Frisk data. We place more involved proofs in the Appendix.
A Model of Biased Decisions
In this section, we develop a model wherein the training data given to a predictive algorithm is generated by a biased decision-making process. For the sake of exposition, we discuss the model in the context of police bias in pedestrian searches and refer to the decision-maker as the police throughout. This will more clearly connect our theoretical results with our empirical application to New York Stop, Question and Frisk. However, this model is broadly applicable to other settings with selective labels such as college admissions, loan decisions and bail decisions, among many others.
Police officers wish to search individuals that have a high probability of carrying contraband.
Following Becker (1957) and a large literature in economics, police officers are taste-based discriminators against African Americans. 2 Based on the search decisions of police officers, data are then revealed to the data scientist. If a police officer searches an individual, the data scientist observes the result of that search (was the individual carrying contraband?), some characteristics of the individual and the stop (age, gender, location of stop, time of stop, etc.) as well the race of the individual. The data scientist then uses this training data to construct an algorithm to predict which individuals are most likely to carry contraband. We focus our attention on analyzing properties of the predictive algorithm produced by the data scientist.
The population
Individuals in the population are characterized by the random vector (X, U, R, Y ). Let X ∈ X denote some set of characteristics about the individual that are typically recorded after a police search such as age, gender, location of stop, time of stop, etc. Let U ∈ U denote characteristics of an individual that are observed by a police officer prior to a search but are typically not recorded.
For example, this may consist of the police officer's evaluation of the individual's behavior prior to the stop or the individual's behavior during the stop. Importantly, U is observed by the police officer but is unobserved to the data scientist. Finally, R ∈ {0, 1} denotes the race of the individual with R = 1 for African Americans, and Y ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether the individual is carrying contraband. The population is then described by the joint distribution P of the random vector (Y, X, R, U ).
Police decisions
The police observe the characteristics (X, U, R) of each individual and decide whether to search that individual. The police officer receives a positive payoff b > 0 if they find contraband after searching an individual and without loss of generality, we normalize this payoff to one, b = 1. The police officer incurs a cost c > 0 for every search. The police officer receives a payoff of zero if the individual is not searched.
In addition, the police are taste-based discriminators against African Americans and receive an additional payoff τ > 0 from searching African Americans. The parameter τ parametrizes the degree to which the police are biased against African Americans. The larger the magnitude of τ , the more biased the police are against African Americans. So the police's payoffs from conducting a search are Y + τ R − c. In order to maximize their expected payoff, the police will decide whether to search according to a threshold rule:
Notice that the bias of the police implies that a lower threshold for search is applied to African
Americans. In this sense, the police are biased against African Americans.
The prediction problem
The data scientist then observes data consisting of individuals that are stopped by the police.
There are "selective labels" -the data scientist only observes whether an individual was carrying contraband (Y ) if the police searched the individual (S * = 1). The data-scientist thus observes the pair (Y, X, R, S * ) for those with S * = 1. In some of our results, we will also consider what happens if the data scientist is able to observe (X, R, S * ) but not Y for those who are not searched by the police. LetP τ denote the joint distribution of the data that is revealed to the data scientist. We index the probability distribution of the observed data by the police's discrimination parameter τ as our results will focus on comparative statics over τ .
Using the observed data, the data scientist constructs a predictive algorithm of whether an individual is carrying contraband Y using the observed features (X, R). In our baseline model, we suppose that the data scientist trains the algorithm using only the data where the outcome is available (S * = 1). For simplicity, we abstract from the estimation problem and simply consider properties of the optimal predictor under squared loss, EP
the conditional expectation over the distribution of observed data.
Main results
Since the police incorporate the unobservable U into their search decision, the training data of conducted searches will tend to be composed of individuals that have values of U associated with higher probability of Y = 1. As a result, the predictive algorithm trained on the selected training data will tend to over-predict the label Y for the whole population.
However, as the police officers become more biased, this selection problem becomes less severe for African Americans. Intuitively, the more biased are the police officers against African Americans, the more likely they are to search any given African American, and so there is less selection on the unobservable U . In the extreme case where τ ≥ c, police officers search all African Americans, and there is no selection on the unobservable U for African Americans. The predictive algorithm thus becomes more favorable to African Americans as the police officers become more biased. We state this result formally.
is weakly decreasing in τ for all x ∈ X and τ such that
Note that for r = 1, T (x, r, τ ) is weakly decreasing in τ . It follows immediately that E[U * |X = x, R = r, U * ≥ T (x, r, τ )] is weakly decreasing in τ , which gives the first desired result. Likewise, when r = 0, T (x, r, τ ) does not depend on τ , which gives the second result.
Theorem 1 shows that as the police become more biased against African Americans, the predictions of the algorithm trained on the selected data become more favorable to African Americans.
Similarly, an automated search rule that decides whether to search an individual using the predictive algorithm will display similar behavior -the more biased the police are against African Americans, the fewer African Americans will be searched by the automated search rule.
Corollary 1. Consider the automated search rule:
The fraction of African Americans searched under S automated (i.e, E[S automated (X, R) | R = 1]) is decreasing in τ , whereas the fraction of whites searched under S automated is constant in τ .
These results clarify the manner in which the bias of police officers influences the algorithmic treatment of African Americans. Surprisingly, the bias of police officers works in favor of African
Americans. We note that this result describes how the algorithm's treatment of African Americans changes as the bias of the police changes. We do not take a stance directly on whether the algorithm's treatment of African Americans for any given τ is "fair" in a formal sense. 3 However, any sensible notion of fairness would suggest that if a given algorithm is unfair to African Americans, then any algorithm that is "harsher" to African Americans (i.e. more likely to search any given African American) and treats whites the same is at least as unfair. Therefore, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 suggest that if an algorithm is unfair to African Americans when trained upon data produced by police officers that discriminate against African Americans at some rate (τ > 0), then an algorithm trained upon data produced by police officers that are unbiased against African Americans (τ = 0) would be even more unfair to African Americans. Hence, the taste-based discrimination of the police officers cannot be the fundamental source of unfairness in this setting.
It is important to note that while we presented these results in the context of police searches, they apply to any setting in which there is a selective labels problem, the decision-maker that produces the selective labels is a taste-based discriminator against a particular group, and the discriminator has access to unobservables. When these conditions hold, the more biased is the decision-maker, the more favorable is the algorithm to the group that is discriminated against. We refer to this phenomenon as "algorithmic affirmative action."
Finally, these results made no assumptions about the underlying population distribution of (Y, X, R, U ). These results apply even if there are differences across groups in the population.
For example, even if the conditional distributions of the features X differ across groups or the conditional distribution of the label Y given the features X differs across groups, these results still hold. We now analyze the extent to which algorithmic affirmative action holds under a variety of different modifications to our baseline model.
Alternative labels
In Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we assumed that the data scientist constructs an algorithm to predict the observed label Y using the training data for the searched sample (S * = 1). We now consider what happens if a different label and sample is used. First, the data scientist may instead predict the human decision S * itself over the full population. This is a common type of prediction problem in some contexts. For example, a series of papers note that using the human decision as the label is common in training algorithms to automate hiring decisions (Cowgill, 2018 (Cowgill, , 2019 Raghavan et al., 2019) . For this prediction exercise, algorithmic affirmative action no longer holds.
Instead, the comparative static in bias now goes in the usual "bias in, bias out" direction.
Theorem 2. E [S * |X = x, R = 1] is weakly increasing in τ for all x ∈ X .
Proof. By the law of iterated expectations, E[S
It follows that for τ 1 < τ 2 ,
which gives the desired result.
A second alternative prediction exercise that the data scientist may also consider is to predict the outcome that the individual was searched by the police and that the individual was carrying contraband. That is, construct an algorithm to predict the label Y · S * over the full sample. Put otherwise, the data scientist imputes the missing label Y to be zero if S * = 0. This type of prediction exercise is common in certain medical applications (see, e.g. Mullainathan and Obermeyer (2017) ). We again find that "bias in, bias out" holds for this prediction exercise.
Theorem 3. E [Y S * |X = x, R = 1] is weakly increasing in τ for all x ∈ X .
Proof. By the law of iterated expectations, E[Y S
Then,
Since the support of Y is weakly positive, the final integral in the previous display is weakly positive, which gives the desired result.
The key distinction between these alternative prediction exercises and our earlier result is that bias now drives a wedge between the true outcome of interest and the label that the algorithm is trained on (S * or Y · S * ). In the original setting that predicts Y over the selected sample with S * = 1, the bias affects the prediction exercise only through sample composition. This is a crucial yet subtle difference.
Taken together, these results show that the choice of label (Y vs. S * vs. Y · S * ) plays a key role in determining whether human biases propagate into algorithmic predictions and automated decisions, formalizing an argument made heuristically in . Table 1 summarizes our results across the three prediction exercises considered. 
for a random decision shock , where has strictly increasing hazard and is independent of X, U, R. Then,
is weakly decreasing in τ for all x ∈ X and τ such thatP τ (S noise = 1 | X = x, R = r) > 0.
Proof. See Appendix for proof.
Similarly, the comparative statics derived for the alternative prediction exercises are also robust to noisy decision-making.
Proposition 2. The conclusions of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 hold replacing S * with S noise .
Excluding group membership from the predictive algorithm
Next, we consider what happens if the data scientist is forbidden from using group status in the predictive algorithm. For example, it may be illegal for a predictive algorithm to explicitly use race as a feature Gillis and Spiess, 2019) . In this case, the prediction function in the baseline model now takes the form EP
Whether the comparative static in bias still holds now depends on whether group status R is "reconstructable" from the observed features X. That is, it depends on whether group status is predictable from the observed features. If group status is perfectly reconstructable, then these results trivially hold for a prediction function that does not use group status as E Pτ [Y |X,
If group status is not perfectly reconstructable, then one can construct examples in which the gap in average predictions across groups for a group-blind algorithm moves in the opposite direction as the gap in average predictions across groups for an algorithm that includes race. The direction of the effect will depend on whether the marginally searched individual in the R = 1 group is more "similar" to the average person with R = 0 or R = 1. As a simple example to illustrate this, suppose there is only one observed, binary feature X. Suppose that among whites, X = 1 with probability 1 − for some small > 0. Among African Americans, X = 0 with probability 1 − . Then, if the marginally searched African American has feature X = 1, then an increase in the bias of police officers will have a larger effect on the average prediction for whites than African Americans, as there are relatively more whites among the group with X = 1 in the observed data. Conversely, if the marginally searched African American has feature X = 0, then it will have a larger effect on the average prediction for African Americans than whites. The same intuition holds for the alternative prediction exercises that we considered earlier.
The reconstruction problem has been discussed at length elsewhere -see, among many others, ; Lipton et al. (2018) ; Chen et al. (2019) ; Datta et al. (2017) . Typically, the reconstruction problem is treated as a source of bias in algorithms. Our results illustrate that this is not true generally. If group status is reconstructable, then an algorithm that is blind to group status may reverse bias and implement algorithmic affirmative action.
Application: New York City Stop, Question and Frisk
We now apply these results to the New York Stop, Question and Frisk (SQF) data. We synthetically create a training data set that is produced by biased search decisions and illustrate the key comparative static described in Section 3.
Data description
SQF was a program in New York City that allowed the police to temporarily stop, question, and search individuals on the street. We use publicly available, stop-level data that contains information on all stops conducted as part of the SQF program from 2008-2013, totalling over 4 million stops of pedestrians and over 350,000 searches (Goel et al., 2016) .
For each recorded stop, we observe whether the stopped individual was searched for contraband and if so, an indicator for whether contraband was found. The data also contains several detailed characteristics of the stopped individual and the circumstances of the stop. The features in the data include the stopped individual's age, gender, and build, and the time and location of the stop. We treat these as the observable features X. Importantly, we also observe the race R of the stopped individual. For simplicity, we restrict attention to stops of non-Hispanic whites and African Americans.
The data also records the officer's stated reason for conducting the stop -for example, the officer can select that the stop was conducted because the pedestrian was "carrying a suspicious object" or "displayed behavior indicative of a drug transaction." We treat these responses as the unobservable features U that are available to the officer at the time of the search decision but are unavailable to the data scientist. This is analogous to "soft information" about the individual that may be available to the officer at the time of the stop but may be unavailable in certain data sets.
Simulation design
We conduct a simulation exercise that trains an algorithm to predict whether a stopped individual is carrying contraband on synthetic training datasets that are generated from the original SQF data. Across synthetic training datasets, we vary the degree of bias against African Americans in search decisions by selectively "undoing" observed searches. We then examine how changing the degree of bias against African Americans affects the resulting algorithm's predictions.
More concretely, we first subset the data to only include stops in which searches were conducted (S * = 1). We then randomly split the searched SQF stops into two partitions. In the first partition, we construct a predictor for carrying contraband among stops with searches. The predictor estimates E[Y |X, R, U, S * = 1], where X is a feature vector that includes demographic information about the stopped individual such as age, gender and build as well as the location and time of the stop, and U is the officer's stated reason for the stop. We construct the predictor using logistic regression, matching the approach of previous research using this data (Goel et al., 2016; Kallus and Zhou, 2018) .
In the held-out partition, we then use the estimated prediction function to construct a synthetic 
Simulation results

Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluated the folk wisdom that algorithms trained on data that are produced by biased human decision-makers will necessarily inherit bias. We showed that in an important class of prediction exercises, the opposite holds: The more biased the decision-maker towards a group, the more favorable is the algorithm towards that group. We called this phenomenon "algorithmic affirmative action." We then showed that the form of the bias and the label used in training are important determinants of whether one obtains algorithmic affirmative action or "bias in, bias out."
These results suggest that when we consider whether algorithms will inherit human biases, it is important to think carefully about the form of the human bias, how it affects the training sample, as well as how the labels and features are selected for the algorithm. Additionally, while some of the literature on fairness in algorithms has focused on blinding algorithms from group membership, our results also suggest that there are cases in which it may be beneficial for the algorithm to be group aware. This is in line with results found by Dwork et al. (2012); ; Gillis and Spiess (2019) .
Our analysis abstracted away from a number of potentially important considerations. First, we assumed that the outcome Y is measured without bias. This is often a significant concern in many empirical settings of interest. Second, our results in Section 3 focused on properties of the optimal, population prediction function EP 
A Proofs of Additional Results
A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proposition 3.1 follows immediately from the following lemma. for a random decision shock, . Suppose that the distribution of ⊥ U |X, R and has an increasing hazard. That is, f ( |X, R, U ) = f ( |X, R) and f ( |X,R)
1−F ( |X,R) increasing in . Then, µ X,R,U |{S = 1, X, R = 1} has the monotone likelihood ratio property in −τ , where µ X,R,U = E[Y |X, U, R] as before.
Proof. The police choose S noise = 1 if and only if µ X,R,U + ≥ c − τ · R, or equivalently, if and only if > c − τ · R − µ X,R,U . Consider µ 1 < µ 2 . Then, P µ X,R,U = µ 1 |S noise = 1, X, R P (µ X,R,U = µ 2 |S noise = 1, X, R) = P S noise = 1|µ X,R,U = µ 1 , X, R P (S noise = 1|µ X,R,U = µ 2 , X, R) × P (µ X,R,U = µ 1 |X, R) /P S noise = 1|X, R P (µ X,R,U = µ 2 |X, R) /P (S noise = 1|X, R) = P ( > c − τ · R − µ 1 |X, R) · P (µ X,R,U = µ 1 |X, R) P ( > c − τ · R − µ 2 |X, R) · P (µ X,R,U = µ 2 |X, R)
where the first equality follows from Bayes' Rule and the second and third apply definitions. Now, differentiating with respect to −τ : ∂ ∂(−τ ) P µ X,R,U = µ 1 |S noise = 1, X, R P (µ X,R,U = µ 2 |S noise = 1, X, R)
2 × P (µ X,R,U = µ 1 |X, R) P (µ X,R,U = µ 2 |X, R)
, Clearly, this derivative is zero if R = 0. If R = 1, the derivative is greater than or equal to zero if and only if
However, since µ 1 < µ 2 , we have c − τ · R − µ 1 > c − τ · R − µ 2 , and so (1) holds if |X, R has increasing hazard.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The modified claim for Theorem 2 follows from the proof of Theorem 2, replacing expectations over U with expectations over the joint distribution of (U, ). Similarly the modified claim for Theorem 3 follows from the proof of Theorem 3, replacing expectations over U with expectations over the joint distribution of (U, ).
